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An Israeli military investigation into a series of mistakes at the beginning of and during the attack, led by Hamas on October 7, 2023, admitted the “complete failure” of the army to prevent it.
In what investigators say is a highly coordinated attack that took years of planning, a group of fighters led by Hamas broke out by Gaza and attacked the Israeli communities and a music festival along the border.
A total of 1139 people died during the attack and about 250 captives taken.
The report describes in detail a history of misconceptions about the risk of Hamas, and a refusal to accept warning signs of attack, as well as the army's inability to coordinate an answer.
While the report exposed many of the failures of the Israeli army on October 7, 2023, such investigations into political failures were repeatedly blocked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right -wing coalition.
How did the Israeli army underestimate Hamas?
The report states that the army has decades of “fundamental misunderstanding” of Hamas, leading to senior officers to underestimate the group's capabilities and intentions.
Military planners have suggested that Hamas was not a significant threat to Israel and that he was disinterested in a large -scale war, according to investigators.
Planners also believe that Hamas's tunnel networks have been significantly deteriorated, with any cross -border threat easily thwarted by the high -tech barrier to divide Israel.
Despite the warning signs, such as unusual activities by Hamas fighters, Israeli authorities insist that the group is focused on maintaining the management within Gaza and will attack Israel from a rocket rather than a large -scale ground invasion.
They also judged Hamas Yahya Sinar leader, accepting that he was “not interested in a broader war.”
What warned intelligence did Israel neglect before the attack?
The hours leading to the attack said in the report, the Israeli military either ignored or misinterpreted several indications that attack was inevitable.
In the evening before the attack, several spokes signaled their commanders of unusual border activities. In addition, officers report the mass activation of Israeli SIM cards, which are known to be in the hands of Hamas fighters, as well as suspicious movements in the deployment of Hamas rocket;
Instead, the commanders relied on what they said were “soothing signs” that Hamas was simply conducting a military exercise.
How does Israeli intelligence mistakenly interpret events?
According to the report, Hamas began to consider the invasion of October 2023 as early as 2016.
However, Israel's intelligence community rejected such reports as “unrealistic”, believing that Hamas was deterred by the Israeli response to the uprising in May 2021, When Israel killed 232 people in GazaS
Since then, the Israeli army realized that Hamas had decided to start his attack back in April 2022. By September of the same year it was ready 85 percent and in May 2023 he identified October 7 as a date.
What were the Israeli operating failures that day?
Many.
The army was unprepared for the attack, the investigators found, and the placement of the troops was significantly delayed, allowing Palestinian fighters to continue without immediate resistance.
In a Kibbutz, Nir Oz, who is accused of abandoning, later a survivor of the Israeli chief of staff that the last Palestinian fighter left long before the first Israeli soldier entered.
It has also been found that the assessments of the fighter numbers are wide from the brand, with planning wildly underestimating the scale of the attack.
It was later found that 5,600 fighters had crossed the border of three waves, supported by a barrage of about 4,000 rockets and 57 drones.
As a result, the Israeli Gaza Division of just over 700 soldiers was buried and for hours remained “defeated” and the military planners did not know about it while coordinating their answer.
Only around 12:00 (10:00 GMT), when reinforcements began to arrive, this Gaza Division began to work.
The report also notes that the Air Force is struggling to distinguish Hamas and Israeli civilians. As the report avoids going into detail, the military has accepted that some Israelis have been killed by friendly fire.
At the same time as the attack, the investigators found, many planes were deployed against Hamas's senior commanders in Gaza instead of defending civilians and soldiers in the attack.
Do the commanders order the Hannibal Directive?
According to several Israeli newspapers, yes, and many civilians have died as a result.
The Hannibal Directive, which orders the Israeli military to use all possible forces to prevent the conquest of Israeli fighters, including the murder of everyone around them, during the attack, Israeli every day, Haarets reportedS
As such, on October 7, orders were issued for the Israeli forces from preventing Hamas from returning to Gaza with captives “at all costs”, which involves killing civilian non-bellows.
Some of the pilots flying over the battlefield do not want to act under the directive and on the occasion of the dismissal, the concern for hitting civilians.
Nevertheless, subsequent investigations show that several civilians were killed as a result of the Hannibal Directive.
One, Euphrate Katz was killed by Helicopter fire as it is transported to a gas by Hamas fighters.
In Kibbutz Beaeri, an Israeli tank launched two shells into a house known to hold over a dozen captives, including 12-year-old twins. Only two captives survived.
What are the key assumes?
Before the attack, key warnings, such as increased activity and intelligence reports, were either ignored or misinterpreted.
The Israeli army's ratings underestimated the scale of the attack, with poor communication and poor sharing of intelligence among commanders adding to the failures
The Israeli army slowly responded to the Hamas -led attack and the reinforcements were too slow when they arrive.
No such investigation has been undertaken by the government's actions before and during the attack.
